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Abstract. Bringing in neo-institutional perspectives, this paper investigates the recent 
corporatisation process of three seaports in Asia and Europe. We focus on whether the 
newly established seaport governance structures follow a path largely affected by the 
local/national institutional frameworks and the political traditions in place. Findings 
confirm that path-dependent decisions largely preserve the institutional characteristics of 
local/national systems, resulting in implementation asymmetries when different countries 
seek generic governance solution. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Global economic changes, technological development and the consequent restructuring of 
transportation process pose significant implications on seaport (hereinafter called ‘port’) 
management and policies. The worldwide response is reforming governance structures, 
aiming to enable ports to provide specialised services, integrate in complex supply chains, 
and execute both public and private responsibilities. The several distinctive variables of 
the sector - as exemplified in this journal (Olivier and Slack, 2006), and elsewhere (cf. 
Bichou and Gray, 2005) - and the increased commonality of the problems faced by 
international ports1 leads various institutions, including inter-governmental organisations 
like the World Bank, to recommend prototype practices that may be employed by all. 
Studies suggest that public agencies, port authorities (PAs), and relevant managing bodies 
often apply generic solutions, differing from those happening in other sectors of the 40 
economy on the basis of the unique characteristics of the port sector (Brooks and 
Cullinane, 2007). 
Despite the similarities of problems faced, reform objectives pursued, and generic 
solutions endorsed, the reform ‘substance’ observed varies significantly. Searching for an 
                                                     
1 For a detailed review on the challenges faced by ports, see: Heaver (1995), Panayides and Cullinane 
(2002), Ng (2006 and 2009). 
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explanation, this paper examines whether the newly established port governance 
structures follow a path affected by institutional frameworks and political traditions. It 
does so based on a systematic analysis on the corporatisation process of three ports, 
namely Busan (South Korea), Rotterdam (The Netherlands) and Piraeus (Greece), which 
allows for both inter- and intra-continental comparisons. The latter is useful, as political 
tradition may differ even within a continent where economic and political integrations 
progress. 
In the 1990s, reforms were undertaken in these ports as the intensification of competition 
was evident in respective regional market shares. Meanwhile, regional political and 
economic developments added extra dimensions to competition, affecting the power of 
managing bodies to deal with new pressures. For example, the EU single market triggered 
the necessity to introduce new structures within Rotterdam and Piraeus when 
decision-makers adapted to the new political reality. The presence of diversified 
institutional frameworks preceded the decisions of stakeholders to embark on port 
reforms. While economic geographers gradually re-figure economic issues with relations 
and cultural terms, this is lacking from port geography’s literature (Olivier and Slack, 60 
2006). Although studies on the effects of ‘nesting’ on private firm behaviours during 
port/terminal investments are available (Airriess, 2001b; Wang et al., 2004), similar 
studies on institutional legacies are found wanting. It is only recently that scholars (i.e. 
Hall, 2003; Jacobs, 2007; Jacobs and Hall, 2007) focused on a concept previously applied 
in the context of transportation (Heritier et al., 2000) and maritime (Pallis, 2002) policy 
evolution: institutional settings do matter. Generalisation and further theorisation can 
enhance and further establish these findings in port governance. 
Following the neo-institutional approach that institutions structure the relationships 
between actors within various units of polity and economy (see Hall, 1986), and with the 
help of the cultural political analyses of the economy (see Jessop and Oosterlynck, 2008), 
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this paper concludes that observed asymmetries of port governance, even with generic 
solution, are results of variations of institutional frameworks within which the 
restructuring strategies are nested.  
Section 2 develops the theoretical foundations. The cases provide evidence on the shapes 
that the restructuring of respective ports have undertaken in the light of the key features of 
political and broader institutional frameworks. Attention is on the implementation 
asymmetries and any restrictions posed on the initially stated adjustments. Section 4 
discusses the findings and their theoretical implications. The paper concludes by 
providing suggestions for further research on the interplay between institutions and port 
governance structures. 80 
2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Worldwide Port Reforms: Applying Generic Solutions 
Decision-makers implement new port governance and management structures to 
positively adapt to changing circumstances via a process similar to other economic 
activities. Three settings unfold over time (Figure 1). In the pre-reform setting, particular 
structures and strategies coordinate relations and behaviours between stakeholders in a 
way matching the original economic and operational environment. Evolving 
circumstances affect (often unexpectedly) market demands and stakeholders relations. 
The original setting finds difficult to execute stated functions and therefore the sector 
adjusts to fit in the new conditions. 
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Figure 1. The road to management reforms and governance 
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Changing conditions in the early 1990s marked an unsustainable setting in port policies 
and strategic management. Ports serving international trade were confronted with new 
trends, as changes in the global division of trade, labour, and capital transformed localised 
Fordist patterns of production and distribution to global, flexible, and customer-oriented 100 
systems. Along with containerisation and technological innovations, they resulted in 
shipping strategies demanding ports integration in spatially expanded supply chains. 
The new conditions upset the status quo. Ports needed to re-position themselves in 
spatially expanded supply chains, blurred geographical monopolies, and increased 
proximity with established and emerging competitors (Notteboom, 2009a; Notteboom et 
al., 2009). This created forces of change of traditional structures characterized by 
bureaucratic (frequently inefficient) control of comprehensive public entities (Airriess, 
2001a; Notteboom and Winkelmans, 2001; Wang et al., 2004). 
To tackle misfits and unsatisfactory outcomes, ports pursued structural governance 
reforms. Reforms and a post-reform setting were the means to address an unsustainable 
setting shared by the industry globally via new port governance structure and strategy. 
Being well-documented (cf. Brooks 2004; Cullinane and Song, 2007), most reforms 
shared key objectives: efficiency, economic benefits through competition, minimizing 
bureaucracy, reducing demands for public investments, enhancing management skills, 
efficient labour organisations, and organisational re-scaling so as to facilitate economic 
coordination between different social and spatial levels. 
An additional feature was the advocacy of generic solution, as typified by the World Bank 
Port Reform Toolkit (World Bank, undated). By endorsing explicitly or not such 
recommendations (see various national port policies in: Brooks and Cullinane 2007a), 
policy-makers gradually moved ports away from direct public management. Through the 120 
devolution to autonomous hybrid entities of mixed forms of ownership, ports transfer 
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operational responsibility (in some cases, port assets), to local (decentralized) public or 
private entities. 
Important questions are yet to be satisfactorily answered. Does the presence of distinctive 
institutional frameworks affect the likely shape of the process of change, the endorsed 
reform strategies and the resulting outcomes? It is possible that policy-makers proceed to 
localised interpretations and face particular limitations in their abilities of applying the 
same tool as others. In this case, the institutional setting stands as factors creating 
asymmetric implementations when generic solution applies to other geographical scales. 
2.2 The Impact of Institutions: Questions and Theoretical Perspectives 
Empirical examination of the impacts of political traditions and relevant frameworks on 
port governance between (or within) nations has only recently attracted academic interests, 
with Airriess (2001b), Hall (2003), Jacobs (2007a) and Jacobs and Hall (2007) examining 
Singapore, Baltimore, Dubai and Los Angeles/Long Beach respectively. They provide 
evidences that choices are restricted by institutional conditions, which lead to diversified 
outcomes and development trajectories. Can these conclusions be generalized? Or are 
these findings location-bound due to peculiarities in the particular samples examined? Lee 
et al. (2008) observe that port evolution in advanced western economies has been 
different from those observed in developing ones, while Ng and Gujar (2009) highlight 
the danger of implementing ‘western solutions’ in developing economies without 140 
investigating fundamental regional differences. By arguing that contextual issues might 
affect port evolution, these studies trigger the need for understanding such 
diversifications. 
Port policy reforms aim in most senses to lower transaction costs. This is irrespective of 
whether they succeed to do so, or, unintentionally create obstacles and inertia towards 
further change. Transaction costs theory (Williamson, 1985) suggests that bounded 
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rationality leads dominant policy-makers advocating the implementation of generic 
solutions. However, in a cultural political economy analysis, Jessop and Oosterlynck 
(2008) suggest that there is little scope regarding implemented reform as 
‘de-contextualised singularity’: when economic forces seek to (re)define specific subsets 
of economic activities, such as subjects, sites, and stakes of competition and/or as objects 
of regulation and to articulate strategies, projects and visions, they tend to deploy power 
to secure results. Still, all these are developed within institutionalized boundaries and 
geometries, and temporalities in a system of mobilised global capital, that can displace, 
defer or sustain inherent contradictions and crisis-tendencies. 
Existing institutions, ‘the formal rules, compliance procedures, and standard operating 
practices that structure the relationships between actors in various units of the polity and 
economy’ (Hall, 1986: 19), promote efficiency among transacting partners, minimize 
distributional conflicts and monitor compliance within social spheres. New conditions 
causing structural contradictions are addressed within established framework via 160 
path-shaped and depended re-organizations (Boyer and Hollingsworth, 1997). State 
structures, shared conceptions about polity and economy and collective political 
experiences influence ideas’ dissemination. Norms and traditions within given societies 
restrict, often informally, economic and social structures from moving too far from 
original forms through ‘embedding’ or ‘nesting’ them into long-run institutional 
characteristics (Williamson, 2000). Even if other stakeholders do not prefer them, 
institutions provide enforcement mechanisms and affect the range and sequences of 
alternatives on choice agendas. Whether by desire or necessity, the values and 
characteristics of institutional frameworks within which economic governance is 
structured will ultimately be incorporated. 
There is a need to balance between economics that naturalizes economic categories and 
soft economic sociology that focuses only on the similarities between economic and 
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socio-cultural activities at the expense of the economy’s specificity.2 In new (historical) 
institutionalism (March and Olsen, 1989; Steinmo et al., 1992; Hall and Taylor, 1998),3 
institutions pose systematic constraints on individual and collective choices, promoting 
certain actions and (preferred) outcomes and pushing non-institutional actors towards 
strategic calculations to ‘optimally’ fit into new environments (Figure 1). Yet, they are 
rarely the sole cause of outcomes. Ultimately, even the institutional framework depends 
on what can be done within the economic sphere, i.e., the pressures along identified 
directions; the possibility of implementation; the nation’s position within the global 180 
economy; and the organisation of labour, capital, and the state. 
That globalization is still highly segregated, both in definition and impacts on economic 
institutions (Grant, 1997; Stiglitz, 2006), increases governance complexity. Brenner (1998) 
coins the phrase ‘glocal scalar fix’, referring to responses to challenges initiated by global 
economic development. Reform instruments should be (and are) used differently 
depending on the differentiation in strategic priorities between authorities locked in 
diversified institutional frameworks (also: Henderson et al., 2002). 
The neo-institutional position recognises that path-dependent policy is affected by 
‘critical junctures’, when events create visions of institutional change and divides events 
into different periods. The development of institutional change design and evolution is 
dialectic (Buitelaar et al., 2007). In addition, coercive and persuasive powers enable the 
development of events (governance forms, institutionalised norms, traditions, etc.) which 
                                                     
2 The division between ‘abstract’ and ‘substantive’ analyses of economically oriented social science 
research is not new (cf. Granovetter, 1985) but calls for dialectic convergence of these approaches are 
increasing (see: Lee et al., 2008). 
3 It is worth clarifying that certain concepts developed within both neo-institutionalism and the culture 
political economy (CPE) frameworks are used to construct a theoretical background to understand change 
in the sector. It is the former, and its emphasis on the nested multi-scalar governance, that provides the 
framework of empirical analysis. The latter provides scope for further research in the ways that the political 
culture framework is affecting the governance change in question.  
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often ‘counterbalance’ the change in completely de-shaping existing structures. In most 
cases, reforms take place incrementally with notable characteristics, reflecting the 
remnants of pre-reform setting (Denzau and North, 1994). 
This account is valid for organizational change and competitiveness (e.g., Powell and Di 
Maggio, 1991; D’Aunno et al., 2000; Johnson et al., 2000; Sminia and Van Nistelrooij, 
2006), including public service organisations. Studies of changes in (ex-)public sectors 
argue that public organizations are major actors in exercising institutional pressures but 
also strongly affected by such pressures (Pouder, 1996). When moving service 200 
transactions to market environments the prominent role of the regulatory framework, and 
legitimacy, is firmly embedded within distinctively social, legal and economic 
environments demand institutional studies (Fernandez-Alles and Llamas-Sanchez, 2008).  
Drawing upon this debate, the forthcoming analysis examines how local port governance 
arrangements are actually ‘nested’ within higher scales of (territorial) governance and 
institutional structures, and how these levels interact to create unique reform outcomes. 
Along with identifying the different outcomes resulting from existing institutional 
legacies, this helps to conclude how the devolutionary process (the re-scaling and 
reformation of governance within particular institutional frameworks) is shaped.  
3 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THREE PORT REFORMS4 
3.1 Pre-reform Port Settings 
Korea, the Netherlands and Greece share diversified institutional and political traditions. 
In Korea and Greece, power largely concentrates within the national government. 
                                                     
4 Because of space limitations, this empirical analysis only undertakes a critical comparative examination 
on the corporatization process of the stated cases. Reference to national institutional traditions is brief; for a 
detailed descriptive analysis that expands in these, and other, issues and is associated with the present study, 
readers should refer to: Ng and Pallis (2007). 
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Business develops according to political needs, though the degree of ‘leadership’ in Korea 
is more pivotal. All countries attempt to adjust to new economic context (due to 
‘unsatisfactory outcome’, see Figure 1), although the dominant force is rather different, 
namely globalization for Korea and European integration for Greece. In contrast, the 
Dutch tradition and, not least, the comparatively recent endorsement of new public 
management, challenge bureaucratic tendencies and advance the concepts of flexibility 
and entrepreneurship as keys in undertaking and executing public policies.  220 
The respective traditional port management and governance reflect such differences. 
Korean ports were regarded as strategic assets. Ownership, operation and planning were 
under the direct leadership of the national government via the Ministry of Land, Transport 
and Maritime Affairs (MLTM), executed through the Regional Maritime Affairs and Port 
Offices (RMAPO) located in different ports.5 The national government owned port land 
and was also responsible for preparing related budgets. All port infra- and superstructures 
were provided by MLTM directly financed by public money. 
The Dutch and Greek cases were typical examples of two (out of three) different 
traditions of port development observed in post-WWII Europe (Chlomoudis and Pallis, 
2002). Dutch ports responded to the ‘Hanseatic’ tradition of landlord PAs with powerful 
managerial and economic presence of local or municipal management. Greek ports 
responded to the ‘Latin’ tradition involving ownership and intervention by the national 
government, via a (usually governmental) managerial body; the concept of public welfare 
services prevailed and national authorities acted as both regulators and service providers, 
through a state-appointed, state-controlled, public PA. 
                                                     
5 Until 2008, Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (MOMAF) executed policies through regional 
offices (RMAFO). Following the latest amendments to the Government Organization Act (no. 8852, 
29.2.2008), MOMAF was dissolved in May 2008, and maritime and port affairs were taken up by MLTM; 
RMAFO was renamed RMAPO. For details, see: MLTM’s website.  
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Each country historically assigned different roles to respective nation port systems. In the 
Netherlands, port competitiveness – particularly Rotterdam – has been a core part of 
national industrial politics since WWII. This is partly due to the size of the cluster 
associated with the port (de Langen, 2002) and partly due to the need to serve another 
core part of the economy, the contribution of the port and its related logistics and 240 
distribution activities made to national GDP. The role of ports in ‘national’ development is 
even more significant in Korea, being the ‘steam engine’ in triggering Korea’s rise as an 
economic powerhouse (BPA, 2006a). On the contrary, the Greek maritime paradigm 
traditionally focuses on flag-state policies supporting the large Greek-owned fleet, placing 
little importance on ports (Pallis, 2007b). The location of Greek ports at the crossroads of 
three continents, and port potential had been overlooked, and the 1930s model of 
state-controlled port organisations remained intact until the late 1990s. 
3.2 Establishment of Port Authority Corporations: structures and functions 
Facing analogous challenges, policy makers in all ports seem to have adopted similar 
reforms - the establishment of Port Authority Corporations (PACs) in line with 
corporatisation as defined by UNCTAD (1995) and endorsed by the World Bank Port 
Reform Toolkit. Within this process, an organisation, originally belonged to the public 
sector, transforms into a corporation with legal status where the governmental bodies hold 
the shares of this newly established corporation. These PAs underwent corporatisation 
within the same period (the last decade), thus comparisons of developments are both 
possible and relevant. 
Busan  
In 2003, the Korean National Assembly enacted the ‘Port Authority Law’, establishing the 
Busan Port Authority (BPA). The objectives of BPA are two-folded: (i) to ensure that 
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Busan contributes significantly to national economic growth; and (ii) develop Busan into 260 
a competitive logistics hub with efficient and optimal services and expand its 
infrastructure (BPA, 2006a). 
The aim was to dilute the ‘public’ image of the PA, strengthen marketing and public 
relations, and advance new projects. With employees being civil servants, BPA recruited 
employees with private sector background expanding from 11 teams and 77 permanent 
staff in 2004 to 17 and 146 respectively in 2006 (BPA, 2006a). Financially, BPA was 
authorised to adopt self-supporting budgeting, with emphasis on income and expenditure 
balance, and maintain separate balance sheet records. This was a significant detachment 
from the traditional system through which the port’s finances being inscribed into the 
national budget. Granting financial autonomy encouraged BPA to be more responsive to 
the business environment while reducing public influence in daily operations. Between 
2004 and 2006, BPA’s net income grew from €6.8 to €12.2m (BPA, 2006a). Financial 
autonomy also implied that BPA assumed responsibility for investments in port 
infrastructure. 
Apart from segregating public-private responsibilities, reforms aimed to address regional 
characteristics that had been overlooked by the national government-dominated system 
(Yeo and Cho, 2007). The establishment of BPA allowed increasing participation from 
Busan’s municipal government on port-related matters, mainly supporting port 
development through financial incentives, like granting profit tax exemptions to BPA for 
three years. Moreover, for the first time, Busan’s municipal government was involved in 280 
the appointment of the BPA’s CEO through the Port Committee. 
Rotterdam 
In 2004, the RMPM (Rotterdam’s Municipal Port Management) Commercial Affairs 
Department and the Rotterdam Port Authority (RPA) formally detached from RMPM to 
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form a public corporation, Havenbedrijf Rotterdam N.V. (PoR). The major responsibilities 
included commercial and financial affairs (including investments of new development 
projects), re-development of old port areas and acquired new customers. The new 
management structure was designed so that PoR would be efficient and sensitive to cost, 
opportunities, customer satisfaction, and social responsibilities (PoR, 2004).  
In terms of human resources, significant restructuring aimed at installing small, 
specialised task-oriented units. Collective agreements with the labour union led to new 
contracts with 1200 RMPM staff. The historically constantly increasing population of 
employees had since 2004 reversed (PoR, 2002-07). The 2006-10 business plan aims to 
reduce the permanent staff population by a further 10% by 2009 (PoR, 2005). In contrast, 
since corporatisation, the number of divisions increased from four to 25 divisions. The 
‘more task-oriented’ units were expected to better monitor work results and enable 
performance-based remuneration policies. PoR also prepares annual reports and business 
plans addressing mid-term business plans, i.e., Port Vision 2020, implementation and 
fulfil long-term objectives. 
The national government traditionally played peripheral roles in port affairs, even though 300 
PoR claimed that port operation persistently contributed 7% of the Dutch GNP (PoR, 
2008). The situation changed with the establishment of PoR, as exemplified by the 2006 
initiative of the national government purchasing 25% of PoR shares. The backing of 
powerful national level lobbies that had a stake in the competitiveness of the port (e.g. the 
National Transport and Logistics Association) had contributed towards this direction. By 
forming multi-scale coalition involving national-level representatives, the national 
government pushed a (trans)port expansion agenda (the Mainport Agenda) against the 
reservations of city authorities who were less keen on attracting more business within the 
port’s premises through a too drastic port governance reform (details: Jacobs, 2007b). 
These developments implied more visible roles for the national government in matters 
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like board members’ appointment and project development. Acting as a new finance 
source to Maasvlakte II, in 2008 the national government planned to invest another 
€500m, increasing its shareholding to 33.3%. Local political shifts where not irrelevant. 
Port expansion and governance reform became strategically and politically coupled with 
the national-state taking this equity but only after power changes at local level worked in 
favour of this development. Meanwhile, it acted as the ‘liaison agent’ between PoR and 
the EU, especially regarding the roles of Rotterdam in trans-national projects like the 
Trans-European Transport Network. Being nested in an institutional framework involving 
emerging supranational policies, the national authority was perceived to undertake more 
active roles. 320 
The presence of the Rotterdam municipal government remained significant, as it stood as 
PoR’s largest shareholder and the owner of its 10500 ha of land and water (leasing to 
PoR). The latter paid approximately €45m worth of dividends annually and subleased the 
land, while it must finance all facilities previously financed by RMPM. Other financial 
arrangements include nearly €1b in loans received by Rotterdam’s municipality to be 
re-financed within 10 years (with the PoR paying off 10% of its debt each year by 
re-financing) and an annual sufferance tax of €12m levied by PoR on supporting facilities. 
Implementing a pre-condition for its establishment, the PoR assumed all port-related 
public obligations that had been performed by RMPM through the within-PoR Harbour 
Master Department the head of which is directly appointed by the municipal government.  
Piraeus 
In 1999, the Greek Parliament enacted Law 2688/1999, converting Piraeus and 11 other 
Greek ports of national interests, from Port Funds to limited companies (Société 
Anonymes, or SA). Each SA had one share owned by the state and would operate as 
private business, with the objective of developing infrastructure and providing quality and 
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competitive services. In 2003, the national government decided to reduce its Piraeus Port 
Authority SA (PPA) shareholding to 74.5% and listed it in the Athens Stock Exchange 
(PPA, 2001-07). With the absence of any relevant public mobilisation for reforms in a ‘low 
interest’ sector, these moves took place only when the national government’s modernisation 
projects coincided with the willingness of EU institutions to promote market openness in 340 
international ports in a way making the state-controlled Greek model unsustainable (Pallis, 
2007b). The new PPA set as primary objectives the improvement of effectiveness, profit 
maximisation through revenue increase, cost reductions due to strict control over the 
expenditures, and the improvement of port service quality. 
The (former and current) civil servant personnel of Greek ports are actively unionised, a 
common feature of Greece’s public sector. Trade unions successfully advocated the 
absence of substantial port labour reforms. Many personnel regulations (organograms, 
operational practices, dockers’ payment schemes) remained the same, though port 
managers had long claimed that labour reforms were essential (Pallis and Vaggelas, 2005). 
Nor was there a new labour statute, as the national government continued to control the 
process of hiring employees (the recent governmental intentions for employing 
unemployed seafarers in ports are illustrative). As Psaraftis (2006) reviewed, Piraeus had 
strict employer-personnel relationship with the workforce that guaranteed, among other 
things, minimum salaries, extensive overtime working hours and the absence of 
negotiations towards more task-oriented port-workers’ gangs. Since corporatisation, the 
endorsed policy of non-replacement of retiring personnel had led to persistent reduction 
in permanent staff population.  
3.3 Commonalities in the reform contents 
It is possible to identify several commonalities in the reforms under examination. First, 
despite the differences between the political systems, decisions in all cases were to 360 
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include previously peripheral stakeholders into new systems. The structural and strategic 
adjustment process corresponding to Figure 1 implied more complex governance models 
involving more stakeholders. Thus, political compromises and power sharing were 
witnessed. In the more corporatist state of all (The Netherlands), a powerful coalition in 
favour of reforms was present. In the most centralised-state cases (Korea and Greece) this 
backing was neither present nor essential. 
Another shared feature was the progress towards financial autonomy of the new entities. 
Recognising that any financial difficulties would jeopardise PACs’ autonomy and thus 
affect genuine changes, all PAs were granted limited financial autonomy and the right to 
prepare independent budgets. As Rowan (2002) noted, budget independence could be 
decisive in determining whether an institution could execute new strategies and policies. 
Finally, all reforms included deliberate attempts to dilute the ‘public sector’ image. In 
BPA and PoR, this was apparent in policies regarding new staff employment. In PPA, 
trade union structures provided an institutional restriction towards this manifestation, 
prompting the national government to prioritise the need of PAs to become SAs. 
Although corporatisation offered similarities, reformed structures and the ‘substances’ of 
PACs were largely diversified in accordance to respective political traditions. The 
following sections examine whether this is also true as regards to (i) the corporate nature 
of the PAs; (ii) the power sharing between different government levels; and (iii) the role 
of national governments in port development projects. 380 
3.4 The corporate nature of the PAs 
Table 1 provides a comparison of the PACs, supporting legal documents and shareholding 
structures. Despite pronouncing each of these entities as a ‘corporation’, Korean and 
Greek governments attempted to preserve their political characteristics. Rather than being 
governed by ordinary company/business laws, PAs were legally supported by special laws 
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enacted by respective national parliaments. While the establishment of PACs was initiated 
by the national governments, the latter either repeatedly refused to issue shares (Korea) or 
insisted on remaining the overwhelming majority shareholder (Greece), thus ensuring that 
the control of PACs lay within the grasps of national administration (Table 2). 
 
Table 1. The corporate structures of different PACs 
Category Rotterdam Busan Piraeus 
Name PoR BPA PPA 
Legal Document Private Company Law (no port-dedicated law) Port Authority Law  Law 2688/1999 
Shareholding Yes No 
Yes (but limited – state the 
majority stakeholder - retains 
74.5% ) 
 
Table 2. The supervisory institution and its key appointments within different PACs 
Category PoR  BPA  PPA 
Name Non-Executive Board Port Committee Board of Directors 
Composition of 
Supervisory 
Board 
Depends on circumstance, 
but no politicians/members 
from interest groups 
6 Interest groups;  
4 academia;  
1 labour union 
6 National Govt.; 
1 Ex-Mayor of Piraeus 
1 Chamber of Commerce; 
1 Econ & Social Committee; 
1 Employee 1 Dock Workers 
Functions of 
Supervisory 
Board 
Nominates and appoints 
Executive Board members, 
including CEO, as well as 
their removal, if deem 
necessary 
Advices the choice 
of CEO to MOMAF 
and the National 
President 
Act as advisor to the key 
stakeholder (state); limited 
decision making capacity. 
PPPSG and CEOs, who run the 
corporation are nominated by the 
ministry  
 
On the contrary, PoR’s structure reflected a much more business-oriented nature in line 
with the recently enacted NPM. PoR was a shareholding company, of which management, 
accountability, supervision and financial operations were implemented on the basis of 
conventional Dutch company law, articles of association, and internal regulations, without 
port-specific laws being introduced (PoR, 2007). This approach was also found in its 
supervisory Non-Executive Board (NEB), where no politicians or interest group 400 
representatives were allowed. In contrast, the composition of the supervisory institutions 
19 
in Korea and Greece reflected diversified political interests, notably interest groups, 
labour unions and dockworkers. In Greece, this body retained limited decision-making 
capacity, as the appointed by the Ministry of Mercantile Marine (MMM) secretariat and 
CEOs ran the corporation. 
An additional differentiation related to the power of respective executive branches (Table 
3). The major function of Busan’s Port Committee was very much restricted in offering 
advice and CEO nominations. BPA had neither genuine power in auditing the executive 
branch, nor appointing or removing the only authorised executive member, the CEO. 
These powers lied within the National President and executive power remained highly 
centralised. The CEO was responsible for deciding and carrying out all executive 
functions and only accountable to the National President. Also, the national government 
did not seem enthusiastic to give complete freedom to BPA in deciding and autonomously 
progressing in development projects. Certain commercial functions remained within the 
centralised public framework ensuring that development would be in line with ‘national 
welfare’, as exemplified by the continual existence of various departments within the 
restructured RMAPO (like Port Logistics Division and Port Construction Office), with 
many responsibilities duplicating BPA’s executive branches. 
 
Table 3. Key executive appointments within different PACs 420 
Category PoR  BPA  PPA 
Name Executive Board (N.A.) (N.A.) 
CEO(s) appointed by Non-Executive Board National President 
Nominated by MMM, 
endorsed by 
shareholders, i.e. 
National Government. 
(the MMM itself) 
Other Executive Members 
appointed by Non-Executive Board (N.A.) (N.A.) 
 
The situation was similar in Piraeus. The Chairman and the Managing Director were the 
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only executive members of the Board of Directors (BoD) (13 members in total) 
nominated by MMM. Their appointments had to be approved through shareholder 
meetings, decisions of which were determined by the supervisory Ports and Policy 
General Secretariat (PPPGS) of the MMM. The same was true for six non-executive BoD 
members who were appointed by the national government. Political interference 
continued to take various forms not limited to general regulatory, planning or financial 
issues. Interferences in tariff setting were present, favouring particular shipping sectors or 
even companies. Psaraftis (2005), CEO of Piraeus port himself (1996-2002), advocated 
that, by refusing to approve requested increases in low domestic ferry berthing rates, the 
government essentially provided subsidies to private coastal shipping companies, many of 
which are listed in the Athens Stock Exchange. 
In contrast, the PoR NEB played more check-and-balance roles. It was authorised to 
appoint the CEO, but also to suspend his/her duty if deemed necessary. The CEO was part 
of an Executive Board (EB) involving a senior hierarchy and expected to make all 
decisions in consultation with all other EB members. All other PoR departments, except 
the Harbour Master, were also business-oriented in both structure and personnel policies. 
The centralised concentration of power was explicit and formalised in Korea. As 
discussed, the National President directly appointed the only executive member - a 440 
theoretically lower (regional) level position. This direct power control was more implicit 
in Greece. In Piraeus, the ‘hands-on’ approach was informal and followed the culture of 
the state’s behaviour against the (ex-)public corporations (utilities or else), whereas the 
state retained a major stake. This resulted in the replacement of CEOs in the aftermath of 
virtually every election contest, or even during ministerial re-shuffles. 6  Yet, the 
formalisation of this intervention was unthinkable and would contradict the existing 
                                                     
6 The PPA was managed by six different CEOs within a decade since its corporatisation. 
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(national and EU) legislative framework. While the Greek national government could be 
regarded as interventionist, it was far from being state-developmentalist. 
3.5 Power sharing between different levels of governments 
Table 4 illustrates the established powers and responsibilities of national governments 
within the respective PACs and ports. The Dutch national government assumed a 
peripheral role. Despite acquiring PoR shares, it was not involved in port operation and 
development, apart from ensuring that they complied with national and EU regulations.  
Compliance with the latter resulted in additional involvement, which was that of the 
liaison agent between the port and the EU, with the latter role being out of the PoR’s 
jurisdiction.  
 
Table 4. Power and responsibilities of national governments within the respective PACs and ports 
Category Rotterdam Busan Piraeus 
Shareholding within PAC 30% (N.A.) 74.5% 
Ownership of Port’s Land No Yes 
Yes 
(Concessioned to the PPA 
for nominal fee) 
Construction of 
Infrastructure Uninvolved Fully involved 
Not formally involved - In 
practice coordinates 
planning 
Introduction and 
Enactment of Port-related 
Laws & Regulations 
Only ensure that port 
operation and 
development is in 
compliance with national 
(and EU) and regulations 
Fully involved Monitoring implementation, 
Assistance in port 
networking and marketing Uninvolved 
Partially 
Involved 
Co-ordinates networking of 
Greek ports but not 
involved in marketing 
Involvement in Port 
Development Projects Limited Significant Limited 
Others Liaison between the port and the EU -- 
Actively involved in the 
liaison between the port and 
the EU 
 
Following a different process, the Korean national government was directly involved in 460 
virtually every aspect of port development: land ownership, infrastructure construction, 
introduction and enactment of port-related laws, networking, marketing and development 
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projects (i.e., Busan Newport - BNP). In Piraeus, it was the national government (not PPA) 
which expressed an intention in 2005 to initiate a concession of Piraeus’s container 
terminals. It was also MMM which proceeded to direct negotiations with multinational 
operators and foreign government (China) about concessions. In 2006, when the second 
MMM proposal for tendering the container terminal resulted in strikes, industrial action 
ended when MMM decided to postpone it. Reportedly, PPA’s BoD was not involved in 
such initiatives. Following a new MMM pubic announcement in November 2007, the BoD 
simply acknowledged the objectives of international public tendering in line with what the 
MMM had determined. Authorities at ministerial level also administered the subsequent 
call for tenders (2008), and the relevant final decision of the winner (Cosco Pacific) on 
February 2009. 
Significant differences are also identified in the power and responsibilities of municipal 
governments (Table 5). In Korea, despite calls for a municipal-level PA - supported, 
among others, by the Government Organization Management Survey Report - Busan’s 
municipal government failed to play any genuine roles. The provisions of tax incentives, 
nominations of Port Committee members, and advising the National President regarding 
the choice of CEO serve as main ‘authorities’. The municipal government did not own the 
port’s land, nor was genuinely involved in any port-related development projects. The 480 
sustained national government-dominated old system was evident in the post-reform 
setting. Limited roles of the municipal government were also observed in the Greek 
post-reform setting, as devolution did not imply significant willingness of the national 
government to share power with local authorities. Although the mayor of Piraeus was a 
member of the PPA BoD, there were no other institutional infrastructures for the active 
participation of either the municipality or the prefecture of Piraeus in PPA’s daily or 
strategic decisions. In Rotterdam, the municipal government retained land’s ownership, 
while it played pivotal roles in infrastructure construction, port networking and marketing. 
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Being the majority shareholder, it remained a key player in deciding the nomination and 
appointments of key personnel within PoR.  
 
Table 5. Power and responsibilities of municipal governments within their respective PACs and 
ports 
Category Busan Rotterdam Piraeus 
Shareholding within PAC (N.A.) 70% Not participating 
Ownership of Port’s Land No Yes Owner of adjunct region 
Construction of 
Infrastructure Uninvolved Fully involved Limited Involvement 
Introduction and 
Enactment of Port-related 
Laws & Regulations 
Uninvolved Fully involved Uninvolved 
Assistance in networking 
and marketing 
No/trivial 
involvement Active involvement Limited Involvement 
Involvement in Port 
Development Projects Limited Limited Uninvolved 
Others 
Tax incentives to 
BPA; Nominates Port 
Committee members; 
Busan Mayor gives 
advice to BPA’s CEO 
appointment 
-- 
Special tax paid by 
PPA; City council 
nominates a 
(non-executive) 
member of the PPA 
BoD  
 
3.6 The role of national governments in port development projects 
Cultural political economy posits that different countries or regions would interpret 
similar concepts differently, thus invoking a critical stand to hegemonic discourses. Hence, 
we compare the perceptions of different authorities in the relevant port reforms. In this 
respect, such differences can be illustrated by focusing on the roles of national 
governments on major port development projects. When projects of considerably different 500 
scale were under development (Table 6), both the Korean and the Greek governments 
financed nearly half of the amount of their respective (budgeted) projects, through direct 
investments taken out from national budgets. For Maasvlakte II - a major project of a size 
having the potential to transform the features of the port system in North Europe - the 
Dutch government regarded the project as ‘conventional business’ and invested 
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corresponding amount to only part of the project through the purchase of 19% of PoR 
shares. Given the calls for more balanced regional development (see: Jacobs, 2007b), the 
government also ensured that PoR would not gain significant competitive advantages due 
to public financing. Furthermore, it substantially emphasized on the environmental and 
social impacts of Maasvlakte II – whereas such emphasis was more implicit in Korea and 
Greece. 
 
Table 6. Role of national governments in port development projects executed and managed by 
their respective PACs 
Category Rotterdam  Busan  Piraeus 
Name of Project Maasvlakte II Busan Newport Pier I 
Motivation for Govt. 
Funding 
Part of the funding of public 
goods, e.g. sea defence 
National priority 
project 
Strategic project for the 
PPA development 
How to fund? Purchasing PoR’s shares Direct investments PPA; EU loans 
How much? €0.5b (19%) €3.3b (45%) €35m (50%) 
What items can be 
funded? Public infrastructure only No limitations 
Infrastructure and 
superstructure 
Environmental and 
social issues Great significance Limited significance Limited significance 
 
In Korea, the ambitious project to construct 30-berth container terminals in Busan by 
2011 was launched by the national government, rather than BPA itself. Limitations on 
construction items and commercial advantages were non-existent, and the national 
government retained pivotal roles in developing BNP (Ryoo and Hur, 2007). As Pusan 
Newport Co. – the BPA’s subsidiary established to manage the construction of BNP – 520 
states, the purpose of the project was the enhancement of Korea’s competitive power 
through the enlargement of port facilities (PNC, 2008). Port policy directions were 
developed in accordance with national targets like concentration on container cargoes 
(notably Busan and Gwangyang), development of port backup area to attract transhipment 
traffic, cooperating with China and Japan, etc. (MOMAF, 2004).7 Given the substantial 
                                                     
7 As indicated, “…BNP is a national priority project that is being driven as one of the three 
national policy projects along with the Incheon International Airport as well as Seoul-Busan 
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amount of public money pumped in, BNP was not just a port development project, but a 
‘national priority’ high on the national agenda, so as to enable Korea to become the 
international logistics centre and sustained its international and regional competitiveness. 
Based on that, BPA acted as an ‘agent’ helping to fulfil such ambitions.  
On the contrary, Maasvlakte II was a port-oriented project pushing Rotterdam’s ambition 
to become a European, even global, hub where the impact of port development on 
national power was lacking. As Maasvlakte II’s website (October 2006) stated: “…now 
that [the Dutch] parliament has taken the ‘go’ decision this week, the Maasvlakte II 
project is…no longer on the national political agenda…”. On this issue, Piraeus shares 
similarities with Rotterdam. Although noted as an important issue in the Greek national 
port policy, the current flagship development project, Pier I, remained port-initiated with 
the core objective of Piraeus becoming a regional transhipment hub, endorsed by the 
government and further expanded by PPA and the European Investment Bank. The 
linkage between the project and the Greek national administration was not significant, 
even though the state was the major PPA shareholder.  540 
However, the state did not disassociate from active decisional involvement in financing – 
as well as charging – practices of Greek ports (Psaraftis, 2006). Unlike Korea, the 
government-restricted public funds invested in Pier I to necessary infra- and 
superstructures, rather than planning and constructing the terminal itself. While 
differences exist regarding the detailed roles of Dutch and Greek governments in the 
progress of Maasvlakte II and Pier I projects respectively, both remain largely 
port-oriented, and the role of government was mainly supportive rather than directive. 
This was in line with the ‘path-dependent logic’ (Boyer and Hollingsworth, 1997) of the 
EU to limit state aid to (ex-)public sector utilities related companies. Hitherto, though, 
                                                                                                                                                               
Rapid Transit Railway project…” (Korea IT Times, 2005). 
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there is no legal regime applying to the port sector.  
4 FINDINGS AND THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK IN RETROSPECT 
The reformed governance models in each of the cases is not dissimilar with the respective 
pre-reform models, with the ‘plays and rules of the game’ (Williamson, 2000) restricting 
the respective corporate and power-sharing structures of the reformed ports within certain 
paths.  
Exogenous factors acted as the catalysts towards port re-structuring, by destabilising the 
pre-reform setting. In all cases, relevant policy-makers anticipated similar governance 
reformations (devolution and corporatisation) to advance financial and decisional 
autonomy, dilute ports’ ‘public’ image, and involve previously peripheral players - 
including levels of public administration - in forming networks of self-governing actors 560 
that participate in port management and development.  
Evidently, the respective reforms implementation followed existing institutional 
framework and traditions and thus the asymmetries observed. Policy-makers enabled 
reforms through decisions that preserved the institutional characteristics of local (national) 
system as much (and as long) as possible, with the result being implementation 
asymmetries when different nations seek generic port governance solutions. 
Reform in Busan reflected the Korean tradition marked by the presence of a 
developmental, and remarkably centralised, state. Citing adjustment to globalisation and 
economic growth, centralised executive leadership remained in port reform structures and 
project developments much in the same way that the national government monitored 
other economic sectors of ‘national importance’. Overcoming the lack of participation of 
local government and the introduction of self-management were welcomed but, in 
implementation, remained minor parts of the adjustments rather than the core of 
fundamental changes. Any attempts in the ‘community-led socialization’ of any core 
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national assets (Hart-Landsberg and Burkett, 2001) were yet to be undertaken. 
Reforms in Rotterdam were nested in the Dutch tradition of decentralised, 
business-oriented, division of the involvement of public authorities in broader public 
sector. Government adjustments re-tuned to promote the implementation of national 
government decisions (NPM principles) associated with multi-scale coalitions with 
business, while they also attempted to maintain balance with (any) local objections. This 580 
was a regular pattern in other sectors of the economy, leading to thoughts that, in this case, 
even a ‘brilliant’ government policy would not materialise if ill-rooted within the 
underlying institutional state structures and deeper socio-cultural developments (Toonen, 
1998). Changes in the balance of national/municipal authorities responsibilities in the 
economy had been for long more ‘path dependent’ than ‘path creating’ (Buitelaar et al., 
2007). However, institutional change was brought by exogenous, non-state dynamics, 
resulting in more active central role in port (development) matters and partial 
re-balancing of national/local public authority responsibilities. This feature was European 
integration and the norms and policies implemented throughout the progress of this 
experiment. 
Reforms in Piraeus were embedded within the Greek institutionalised traditions of an 
interventionist state. Apart from retaining ownership, the state maintained control through 
national-level mechanisms, rather than devolving power to municipal/local authorities. It 
sustained its ‘hands-on’ approach in almost all daily and strategic decisions, while 
continuously failed to effectively negotiate reforms with the strongly unionised public 
sector’s work force. Since the early days of reform (1999), both socialist (until 2004) and 
neo-liberal (2004-2009) governments argued for autonomous port entities. Changes were 
occasionally evident in administrative configuration only; in practice, no government 
broke its political culture to implement and enforce change. Even when not resulting from 
configuration, intervention remained strictly informal. Some forms of intervention were 600 
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restricted due to the need to comply with the features of the institutional framework that 
were structured by Greece’s commitment to European integration.  
Apparently, structural variations of port governance reform implementations are 
‘locked-in’ (Pierson, 1993) the respective norms, practices and forms of public and 
private actors’ interaction in local polity and economies. Moreover, the analytical results 
support the ‘glocal fix’ proposition (Brenner, 1998): they indicate that regional 
institutional (at least) differences imply diverge potentials of how globally generic 
solutions would be implemented locally. On the other hand, by establishing the 
association of port governance reform implementation with the institutional setting, the 
three-cases enhance in specific respects (i.e., local scale) Hall’s (2003) conclusion that 
considerable pressures by international inter-governmental institutions and potentially 
private actors for globally applying similar port governance reforms imply that institutional 
transformation, rather than convergence of port-related institutions, is more likely.  
The findings are in line with the transformations of Singapore (Airriess, 2001a) and 
Dubai (Jacobs and Hall, 2007) to global hubs, the comparative study of South California, 
Dubai and Rotterdam ports by Jacobs (2007a; 2007b), and the remarks on the importance 
of contextual traditions for port models (Lee et al., 2008). The contextual role of 
developmental state in the corporatisation of Singapore is very similar to the one observed 
in Korea. The role of institutional framework in shaping relationships between actors 
involved in the provision of specific (i.e., Dubai) port’s land, infrastructure and 620 
superstructure, is evident in all the examined cases. In this respect, this study enriches 
generalisation of the previous studies’ conclusions. 
Public officials deliberate over formal choices; hence, governance transformation is 
ultimately associated with implementation asymmetries dependent on the path that is 
established by broader political and economic traditions. As Notteboom (2009b) argues 
such path-dependency affects port system development making models to be applied to any 
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ports inapplicable. With a variety of (un)successful performing governance structures 
being present, this study contributes to a better understanding of whether, and why, port 
reforms have actually (un)fulfilled the initially set objectives. The findings strongly 
recommend that decision-makers need to go beyond simple predicaments of the collective 
effects of policies, and understand the institutional characteristics - requirements and 
limitations - at the early stage of reform possible, as they can affect comprehensively the 
implementation of their choices. 
At a future point, the output (performance) of the three reform implementations examined 
will background further adjustments. This feedback loop (detailed in: Brooks and Pallis, 
2008), involves a transition period that may last more than 10 years. All reforms 
examined had only been undertaken recently (within less than four year before the 
research). The period of transition is not yet over and it would be unjustified to look into 
which port reform is (un)successful and how this might trigger further adjustments. Even 
when the governance model is fully implemented estimations of its output are not 640 
instantly possible because of the demanded cultural and operational adjustment by all 
those involved (Delmas and Tokat, 2005). Future research is required to focus on 
outcomes and examine their potential association with reform implementation 
asymmetries. This will advance the discussion and reveal further policy conclusions. How 
to measure the outcomes is also subject to further research though, with Ng et al. (2009) 
providing constructive insight. 
As detailed in Figure 1, establishing the role of the political institutional framework does 
not imply that it alone explains the entire reform process. Additional elements have an 
impact, with the changing economic environment being a key one. As commonly 
accepted, changes over the last two decades resulted in similarities of the challenges faced 
by all international ports around the world without however diminishing the ‘locality’ of 
some market conditions. This research emphasized the former developments, 
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quintessentially acting as ‘exogenous factors’ faced by all ports around the world 
including those studied: apart from being global hubs, Busan and Rotterdam are very 
important regional hubs, precisely as Piraeus is. All of them need to adjust to similar types 
of changes in shipping and supply chains while facing intensified competition from 
neighbouring ports targeting similar markets (like Shanghai, Hamburg; Izmir and Mersin 
respectively). The chasing of generic solution by all three is not irrelevant. All these 
provided the scope of research seeking additional causes of implementation asymmetries; 
and dictated the decision to examine to confirm the extend that differentiation. 660 
Conversely, this does not mean an undervaluation of existing ‘local’ market situations. 
Rotterdam faces stiff competition not only for attracting transhipment but also cargo 
to/from major European hinterland regions such, while Piraeus plays a much more local 
role compared to Rotterdam and Busan. Having established the role of political culture in 
case of some major transshipment ports exposed at similar economic conditions of global 
scale, it is useful to proceed to additional comparisons of different nature (e.g. between 
ports facing similar political cultures but different port reforms), in order to conclude on 
the extent that differences in concrete local market challenges stand as additional 
explanatory (or causal) factors towards reform implementation asymmetries within the 
same economy.  
5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The comparative examination of recent reforms in the case of three international ports of 
three countries with different institutional traditions, works in favour of the new 
institutional hypothesis that (port) governance association is associated with 
implementation processes dependent on the path that is established by the broader 
institutional frameworks in which the economy develops. 
By enlightening the correlation and causality between institutions and governance reforms 
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implementation, this study also provides a platform for future port research. As port 
studies remain preoccupied on the public vs. private responsibilities emerging in the 
post-reform setting, the role of political traditions in deciding the nature of recently 680 
reformed organizations is a theme that has only recently become part of the research 
agenda and has yet to be comprehensively assessed. The issue of causality needs to be 
further established by research in other dimensions as well; for instance Hall and Jacobs 
(2009) conceptually turn the analysis on the emerging institutional proximity of ports 
themselves and the effects that ‘too much’ and ‘too less’ of this proximity may have on 
inter-port competition in infrastructure upgrading and innovation.  
This study suggests that, similar reforms follow divergent paths of trajectory in different 
regions with political-cultural traditions standing as causal factors. Hence, relevant local 
and national port policy-making agents and stakeholders should be cautious rather that a 
priori accepting generic solution put forward by global institutions. The case studies serve 
as an ideal base to extend similar analysis towards other regions, including currently 
under-researched emerging markets, and develop a general theory explaining the ways 
institutional frameworks and political traditions affect the process of reforming a unique 
in certain respects economic sector and, not least, better understanding the evolution of 
port development.  
The conducted examination of the implementation phases of previously decided reforms 
provides a first engagement of port studies with the cultural political economy (CPE) 
account. It is worth using this account further, examining why particular options had been 
in the first instance chosen at the expense of others. The focus of this study was at a later 
stage of the reform, the one happening once this choice is made; as stated outright (title) 700 
with the use of the three case studies we shed light on the correlation of ‘implementation 
asymmetries’ once the relevant policy makers have opted for the same generic solution. In 
a CPE (Jessop and Oosterlynck 2008) vein, empirical analyses might seek explanations 
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about how economic and policy actors within a polity understand and develop key 
institutional concepts for the economy, e.g., efficiency, state, capital-labour relationships, 
etc., how these differ from the understanding of others, or even within the same society 
(i.e., the interplay of localised conditions and economic environment might result in a 
variance of reforms even within the same country) and what all these mean for either the 
choices made or the structuring of the institutional framework, which in turn affects 
choices implementation. The CPE framework also invokes a more critical stand when 
studying hegemonic discourse such as the neo-liberal pre-economic crisis calls for port 
governance reforms in order for ports ‘to only stay competitive’ in a system of mobilized 
global capital. As such discourses are altered – in the early 2010s the shift towards 
‘sustainability’ is evident – a discourse analysis in a comparative CPE fashion would 
further advance knowledge about port governance formations within specific polities and 
institutional contexts. 
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